Here “mystical
experience,” primarily means contentless noetic
experience.
Visions, voices, etc. are not mystical in this
sense.
Plotinus sees mysticism as an intellectual
experience, indeed the intellectual experience par excellence –
not a flight from truth into emotional reverie. He
distinguishes two intellectual activities:
to noein, to know, in which the
intellect sees its contents, and to me noein, to know
not, in which it looks beyond its contents to the One. Accordingly, Plotinus’
recipe for entering a mystical state is to empty one’s mind of
all empirical content including the inner dialogue. The Cloud of
Unknowing, by an anonymous 14th century
English cleric, and St.
John of the Cross (1542-1591) use
the same recipe.
It also enters the ganzfeld protocol.
Bucke experienced mystical
ecstasy spontaneously in 1872, and saw it as the third
stage in the evolution of conscious, after sensory
response and normal human awareness. His instant of “cosmic
consciousness” was marked by suddenness, a
subjective light, intellectual enlightenment, losing his fear
of death and gaining a sense of immortality, and moral
elevation with loss of guilt. It showed him
the universe as vital instead of lifeless.
William
James had no mystical
experiences, but knew Bucke. For James,
mystical experience is characterized by ineffability,
“no adequate report of its contents can be given in
words,” and noetic
quality, “states of insight into depths of truth
unplumbed by the discursive
intellect.”[i] He
also notes transiency, the
experience fades quickly in the face of daily life, and
passivity. Mystics often
report it beyond their power to cause a mystical
experience.
Rudolf Otto writes of the
non-rational (as opposed to irrational) and non-sensory
character of what he calls “the numinous.” It is non-rational
because it is not the result of discursive, step-by-step,
reasoning but is a direct, non-sensory mode of
experience.
Mystical experience is not an
aberration of a few underdeveloped or deranged
minds. In the
early 1970’s The National Opinion Research Center polled 1500
representative Americans, asking, “Have you
ever felt very close to a powerful spiritual force that seemed
to lift you out of yourself?” Approximately 40%
acknowledged having had at least one such
experience. Those
who “often” had such experiences were
disproportionately male,
disproportionately black,
disproportionately college-educated,
disproportionately above the $10,000-a-year income
level, and disproportionately Protestant.[ii]
The respondents were given
the Bradburn test for psychological
well-being.[iii]
The “the relationship between frequent ecstatic
experiences and psychological well-being was .40, the
highest correlation, according to Bradburn, he has ever
observed with his scale.”[iv] A
similar British survey showed “at least a
third of British adults claim to have had a direct mystical”
experience.[v]
Mystical experience in modern Anglo-American
culture compares to sexuality in Victorian culture:
both greatly affect our lives, but discussing it is socially
unacceptable.
Stace made a detailed
cultural and phenomenological study of mysticism.[vi] He found two types of
mystical experience sharing common
characteristics across cultures and
religions, viz. introvertive and
extrovertive. We first met introvertive
experiences in Vedic mysticism, then in Buddhism, Plotinus, and Jewish, Sufi and Christian mysticism.[vii] It
is characterized by the absence of any sensory content or
image, by a sense of unity, profound psychological
satisfaction, and a conviction that words are inadequate
to the experience. The extrovertive type
differs in including sensory data. In it, sensory
experience is intensified and accompanied by a sense of
the unity of all things, even though individual entities
remain identifiable.
The characteristics
Stace found to be
cross-culturally shared are, in the case of extrovertive mysticism:
1. The unifying
vision, expressed abstractly by the formula “All is One.”
The One is, in
extrovertive mysticism, perceived through
the physical senses, in or through the multiplicity of
objects.
2. The more concrete
apprehension of the One as being an inner subjectivity in all
things, described variously as life, consciousness, or a
living Presence.
The discovery that nothing is “really”
dead.
3. Sense of
objectivity or reality.
4. Feeling of
blessedness, joy, happiness, satisfaction,
etc.
5. Feeling that what
is apprehended is holy, or sacred, or divine. This is the quality
which gives rise to the interpretation of the
experience as being an experience of “God.” It is the specifically
religious element in the experience. It is closely
intertwined with, but not identical with, the previously
listed characteristic of blessedness and
joy.
6.
Paradoxicality.
Another
characteristic may be mentioned with reservations,
namely,
7. Alleged by
mystics to be ineffable, incapable of being described in
words, etc.[viii]
For introvertive experiences, points 1
and 2 become:
1. The Unitary
Consciousness; the One, the Void; pure
consciousness.
2. Nonspatial,
nontemporal.[ix]
Stace’s picture of
mysticism, while
helpful, is inadequate to advanced mystical
experiences. In his work on
John of the Cross,[x] Steven Payne criticized Stace’s
characterization as insufficient to St. John’s
experiences.
Payne observes that
The four
Sanjuanist passages cited as
evidence for the “universal core” hypothesis in chapter seven
of Mysticism and
Philosophy are drawn from a section of Ascent [of Mount Carmel] II
which deals, not with the most advanced spiritual
illuminations, but with the first beginnings of contemplative
prayer.[xi]
Stace systematically
rejects data evidencing a unique element in the
Christian mystical
experience: love.
R. C. Zaehner notes a distinction
made by the Flemish mystic John of Ruysbroeck (c.1293-1381)
between a natural state of mystical emptiness, meeting
Stace’s criteria
for a “core” mystical experience, and a
“supernatural” experience with the additional
experiential element of love.[xii]
Stace writes this off, discounting the love element as
“emotional.”[xiii]
Strangely, he does not say this in dealing with the “feeling [italics mine]
of blessedness, joy, happiness, satisfaction, etc.”
which he claims as essential marks of mystical
experience.
Further, on Stace’s analysis the
introvertive experience,
in which Ruysbroeck is admitted to share, is devoid
of sensory content.
Surely, the emotion of love is
sensual, so Stace is inconsistent in seeing the love
experience as an emotional overlay on a
quintessentially intellectual experience. The only consistent
interpretation is that the love experience reported by
Ruysbroeck occurs at an intentional level.
Stace’s methodology calls for
crediting the mystic’s report of his experience, while
possibly questioning his interpretation. Yet, here he chooses
to ignore his methodology. Ruysbroeck reports different
experiences which he labeled “natural” and
“supernatural.” While Stace can consistently claim that
Ruysbroeck’s interpretation is inappropriate, he cannot
consistently accept Ruysbroeck’s report of the
“core” experience while denying his report that other
mystic events are distinguished by love. The existence of this
difference, whatever its proper
interpretation, falsifies Stace’s claim that all
introvertive experiences are
essentially the same.
Stace admits, “that love is
emphasized by the Christian mystics but not in
Vedantic monism,” then methodically ignores that datum. Thus, we cannot accept
Stace’s assertion that Ruysbroeck’s mystical
experiences are point by point
identical with those in the Mandukya
Upanishad.[xiv] Stace is put off
by the Trinitarian interpretation
Christian mystics give deeper experiences. Failing to see that
orthodox Christianity affirms the essential unity of
God as absolute,
Stace feels Trinitarian doctrine is incompatible with the
experience of undifferentiated unity claimed by all mystics. Stace need not accept
Trinitarianism as a prerequisite for a philosophical
investigation of mystical experience. Still, before
venturing to criticize Christian mystics’
Trinitarian interpretation of their own experience, it
would be well to understand the meaning and
implications of their language.
The essence of
Trinitarian theology[xv] is that, while God is essential one, that unity
has internal relationships arising from God’s
Self-knowledge (the Procession of the Son), and
Self-acceptance (the Spiration of the Spirit). This intentional,
relational structure is the basis of the Christian understanding of a
Trinity of “Persons.”
It is the very structure of love: Mind, Knowledge and
Acceptance. Thus,
the experience of the Trinity is not an experience of three
faces somehow merged in a single Godhead, but of God’s
internal loving-knowledge. So, when
Ruysbroeck claims
love in his experience of God, he adds nothing by saying he
has penetrated God’s essential unity to find a
Trinitarian nature.
“Trinity” bespeaks God’s immanent, personal
love.
The claims of Christian mystics to have
experienced the loving aspect of God is not the simple
addition of an accidental, emotional note to Stace’s core experience,
but a claim to having been admitted to God’s inner life. One can choose to
accept or reject this claim, but one cannot dismiss it as an
accidental embellishment.
The deficiency of Stace’s analysis of
mysticism is not
confined to Ruysbroeck, but is general. Earlier, we
saw that Payne found it inadequate to St. John of the Cross’s
experiences, but the loving, Trinitarian experience is not
confined to Christian mystics. It is attested to in
Buddhists by Daisetz T. Suzuki. He relates the
Trinitarian interpretation of Elkhart’s mystical
experience to the
Buddhist’s prajña-intuition.[xvi]
So, Stace’s “core”
introvertive experiences lie at the
foot of path of progressive contemplative
perfection. That
path can lead to the spiritual
marriage, a continuous state of
deep mystical awareness or union (opposing William James and Stace’s claim of
essential transience). While Plotinus and others suggest a
technique for entering the mystical state, there is a general
sense that the higher stages, at least, of mystical
experience are not
deterministic consequences of
the mystic’s preparation, but result from a gracious and
unforeseeable initiative by God, uncompelled by human
work.
In sum, Stace’s
phenomenology describes a unique
human experience, i.e. mystical
enlightenment. His phenomenology
ignores the distinction between loving and non-loving
experiences, as well as advanced, continuing
mystical states described by writers in the
Christian tradition. Stace succeeds in
showing that the “core” experiences are
cross-cultural, but not in showing that they are entirely
culturally independent. Instead, we can trace
the diffusion of mystical technology from its Vedic roots to
its Christian, Moslem, and Buddhist practitioners. Like any
technology, mysticism works because there is
an aspect of the cosmos, a physis, which may be
effectively engaged by human intentionality. Still, in some
measure at least, mystical technology differs from others in
that even its most adept practitioners cannot effect it
with determinate reliability.
[i] James (1902), p.
293.
[ii] Greeley and
McCready (1975), “Are We a
Nation of Mystics?
” Greeley (1974), Ecstasy: A Way of
Knowing, and McCready (1974), “A Survey of Mystical
Experiences.” According to the U. S. Census Bureau, the 1970
median income was $6,670 for males and $2,237 for
females.
[iii] Bradburn (1969), The Structure of
Psychological
Well-Being.
[v] “Mystic Moods Move British,” Boston Pilot, June 17,
1977, p.
5.
[vi] Stace (1960a), The Teachings of the
Mystics.
[vii] Cf. Inge (1899) and Underhill
(1930).
[x] Payne (1990), John of the
Cross and the Cognitive Value
of Mysticism. See the review by D. F.
Polis (1993a).
[xi] Payne (1990), p. 96.
(References Stace (1960), p. 103, and Ascent II, 12, iii;
13, iv; 14, xi; and 12,
vi.)
[xii] Zaehner (1957), Mysticism: Sacred and
Profane, pp.
170-4.
[xiv] Stace (1960),
pp. 95ff.
[xv] Cf. S
T I, qq. 27-43.
[xvi] Suzuki (1957), Mysticism:
Christian and
Buddhist,
p.
29f. |